From Secrecy to Patenting: The Disclosure Effects of Patent Box Incentives
Sole-authored
Patent box regimes raise firm patenting by inducing a substitution away from trade secrecy, with downstream effects on peer productivity and industry structure.
Abstract
Patent boxes have emerged as a prominent innovation tax incentive. They offer preferential tax rates on qualifying intellectual property income commonly tied to patent protection. I examine whether these regimes induce firms to substitute from trade secrecy toward patenting. Using their staggered adoption across Europe, I document a large and immediate increase in patenting, consistent with firms bringing unpatented inventions into the public patent system. The response varies with prior protection practices, proprietary disclosure costs, and regime design in ways predicted by the substitution mechanism, while real innovation inputs show little contemporaneous response. Confidential survey evidence around Portugal's 2014 adoption provides direct support for the substitution mechanism: secrecy use declines as patent use rises. Consistent with downstream knowledge-diffusion effects, post-adoption productivity gains increase with firms' technological exposure to the expanded patent stock, while industry concentration declines. These findings highlight a disclosure channel through which patent boxes promote knowledge diffusion, a margin that traditional R&D tax credits do not directly target.
Presentations
13th Annual Mannheim Taxation Conference, 2026 AAA/Deloitte Foundation/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium, HKAAA Rookie Camp 2026, University of Hong Kong





